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Abstract  
I explore a unique exogenous instrument to examine how the intra-familial position of women influence 
health outcomes of their children using micro data from Ghana. Using the 2SLS-IV estimation technique, 
I build a model of household bargaining and child health development with perceptions of women 
regarding wife-beating and marital rape in the existence of domestic violence laws, in Ghana. Even 
though the initial OLS estimates suggest that women’s participation in decisions regarding purchases of 
household consumption goods help to improve child health outcomes, the IV estimates reveal that the 
presence of endogeneity underestimates the impact of women’s bargaining power on child health 
outcomes. Our choice of instrument is robust to endogeneity, father characteristics and residency 
robustness checks 
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1. Introduction 
Mothers play a critical role in fostering early childhood development, strongly influencing children’s 
long-term intellectual and physical health (Smith and Haddad, 2000). However, despite progress in the 
last few decades, women continue to be disadvantaged in economic as well as familial spheres in many 
societies, with obstacles ranging from discrimination in the labor market, access to credit, to inheritance 
and ownership rights in the family (World Bank, 2011).  
The recognition that the unequal distribution of intra-household power may have heterogeneous 
implications for parental investments in children has ignited a growing interest in intra-household 
resource allocation and its implication for developmental outcomes of children. This project revolves 
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around intra-familial position of women in Ghana and its implication for early childhood development 
regarding health.  
A survey of the literature, however, reveals a lack of consensus on the measures of bargaining 
power. In the literature, bargaining power within households has been measured using direct and indirect 
proxies like relative income contribution, educational attainment, and direction of dowry, inheritance and 
ownership rights (e.g. Blumberg, 1988; Anderson  and Eswaran, 2009; Friedemann-Sanchez , 2006).  The 
differences in the measures of women’s bargaining power may be attributed to the diversity in the 
political and social institutions and norms across countries and cultures.   
It is therefore important from a policy point of view to understand the effect of women’s 
bargaining power on early childhood development in each country through the lens of the norms and 
institutions that are peculiar to the culture of that country. 
In this project, I argue that the effect of women’s bargaining power on child health in Ghana is 
mediated through domestic violence laws, which protect women from marital rape and wife beating. The 
choice of domestic violence laws as an instrument for bargaining power will enable me to address any 
endogeneity associated with the direct measure of bargaining power. In the literature, when child 
development outcomes are regressed on direct measures such as women’s degree of control over 
household decisions, they tend to yield biased and inconsistent Ordinary Least Square (OLS) estimates 
due to the endogeneity of the main regressor (Bernal and Keane,2010).  
 Endogeneity may arise because in many societies, women with high quality (healthy and well-
educated) children tend to gain more respect in the family and community, hence more bargaining power. 
In this case, the reverse causality becomes a threat to consistency. Endogeneity may also arise because in 
the Ghanaian society there is a traditional predilection for male children. As a result, women with male 
children tend to have a lot of respect within the family, obtain more bargaining power and may be able to 
invest more in their children (especially when they are all males). 
To deal with the endogeneity, the 2-Stage Least Squares –Instrumental Variable (2SLS-IV) 
estimation technique is employed. I make use of the existence of domestic violence laws (which is 
captured as women’s attitude towards wife-beating for refusing to have sex with the husband) as an 
exogenous instrument for women’s bargaining power.  This instrument is exogenous because in 
jurisdictions like Ghana with judicial systems that protect women’s rights, strong incentives exists for 
women to exercise their rights and participate more actively at all levels of decision making. These laws 
therefore confer bargaining power on women independent of the child.  
The Domestic Violence (DV) Law, which has been in enforcement since 2007 contains 
provisions that criminalize various acts of violence – physical, economic and psychological abuse, 
intimidation, and harassment (Manuh, 2007). Therefore, there is an indication of low self-esteem or non-
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empowerment if a woman (even after the passage of this law)  believes that a husband is justified in 
beating his wife for refusing sex. Such a perception could act as a barrier for women in accessing 
effective health care for themselves and their children (Ghana Demographic and Health Survey, 2008).  
To understand this whole interaction within a structure, this paper develops a model of household 
bargaining with women’s attitude towards wife beating and marital rape and its implication for child 
health outcomes. The implications of the model are then tested using the 2008 Ghana Demographic and 
Health Surveys (hence GDHS) data.  The choice of Ghana is important because it allows me to explore 
the existence of domestic violence laws as unique instrumental variable for the first time in the literature. 
It also helps to provide robust empirical support for designing policy measures targeted at 
bridging gender gaps to affect child development outcomes in Ghana where women lack influence in 
household decision-making, mainly because of strong patriarchal family structures, even though, they 
constitute more than 50% of the population (Baden  et al, 1994) 
This is the first paper to explore domestic violence as an instrumental variable for women’s 
bargaining power whilst testing its implications for child health outcomes using a unique micro data set.  
2. Research Questions  
I have two objectives. First to identify an exogenous instrument for women’s bargaining power and to 
construct a model with this exogenous instrument to examine the effect of this power on child health 
outcomes using micro-level data from Ghana. 
 
3. Literature Review 
a. Theoretical Literature  
Several useful models on intra-household resource allocation and bargaining have emerged after a 
substantial body of literature on household bargaining questioned the validity of the traditional unitary 
household model. The unitary model, which treated household as a single unit with common preferences, 
utility, decisions and choices, has been unable to withstand a number of empirical verifications (e.g. 
Schultz , 1990 and Thomas 1990). 
As a result, there is a growing consensus in the literature that the household behavior cannot be 
modelled as though members of the household had a set of stable preferences. However, though there 
exist several useful alternatives, there is no agreement on the best way to model household behavior. 
Indeed, the literature recognizes that models on household bargaining may differ to reflect the social, 
economic and cultural contexts in which they are used (Chiappori  et al, 2006). In this section, I provide a 
brief overview of some of the existing models proposed to replace the unitary model. 
Collective Model 
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The collective model developed by Chiappor i, (1988) and restructured by Chiappori et al (2006) 
recognizes individual preferences within a household and enables individual bargaining power to 
influence household choices and outcomes.  The model assumes that regardless of how decisions are 
made, outcomes made under these assumptions are always Pareto efficient. The implications of this 
model have been upheld by several empirical studies (e.g. Vermeulen , 2000) 
 
Non-Cooperative Model 
The non-cooperative model assumes that resources earned by individuals are expended according to 
individual preferences and interests (Ulph , 1988). There exists no pooling of resources as it happens in 
the unitary or cooperative models. There are however, mixed opinions in the literature on whether 
outcomes made under the assumptions of this model are pareto-efficient (Bourguignon  et al (1993); Udry  
(1996)). 
The Cooperative Bargaining Model  
The cooperative bargaining model, also like the collective model, assumes that household bargaining 
outcomes are Pareto-efficient. It however establishes more firmly, the process by which the pareto-
efficient outcomes are attained, by assuming the presence of a threat point for each household member 
(Elroy and Horney , 1981 and Manser  and Brown, 1980). The threat point is usually an external utility 
option to members of the household. An example of this outcome is “divorce”, where the threat point for 
the household is dissolving the marriage. The efficiency of divorce as a threat point for intra-household 
bargaining however remains largely debatable (Lundberg  and Pollak, 1993). Per the data used in this 
paper, household decisions are made under  the assumptions of the cooperative bargaining model where 
resources are pooled and decisions made reflect individual preferences. The threat point for making 
pareto-efficient decisions lies in the ability of any ‘abused’ member of the household to exploit or use 
domestic violence laws to seek redress. 
b. Empirical Literature  
A number of studies suggest that women’s participation in economic activities is a sustainable way to 
help build human capital in developing countries.  This section surveys the results of extant studies, on 
the subject of intra-household bargaining and child development outcomes.  
Using women’s ethnicity, “arguably”, as an instrument for bargaining power, Lepine  and Strobl 
(2013) found that women with bargaining power tend to have children with better nutritional status in 
rural Senegal.  Whilst Ueyama  (2006), with household survey data from rural Malawi, found that 
women’s participation in agriculture has a positive effect on child health, through the added ‘income 
effect’ and ‘food effect’. Afridi  et al (2012) also studying the impact of India’s National Rural 
Employment Guarantee Scheme (NREGS) on children’s educational outcomes via women’s labour force 
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participation, found that greater participation of mothers in the program was associated with better 
educational outcomes of their children.  
Similarly, Smith (2003) also using DHS household surveys for 36 South Asian, Sub-Saharan 
Africa, Latin American and the Caribbean countries, found a strong association between the index of a 
woman’s decision-making power and her child’s nutrition. 
 On his part, Kishor (2000) used data from Egypt’s 1995 DHS and employed multivariate 
analyses to explore the correlations between women’s empowerment and child health. The study found 
that a woman’s lifetime exposure to employment is significantly correlated with both child survival and 
health. 
Furthermore, studies such as Haddad et al. (1997), Thomas  (1997), Quisumbing  and Maluccio 
(2000), Doss  (2001), Duflo and Udry (2004) and Fantahun  et al, (2007) also found a positive 
relationship between women’s empowerment and either child development outcomes.  
Even though cultural norms and political institutions strongly influence child outcomes by either 
constraining or improving women’s bargaining positions, there exists major gaps, in the literature, in 
spelling out the dynamics of these processes (Agarwal , 1997). This is because, majority of the literature 
has tended to focus on more direct and observable measures such as incomes, education, participation in a 
microfinance program or agriculture etc.  For example, in view of the societal preference for male 
children in China, women with first-born sons have been found to have greater bargaining power than 
women with first-born daughters (Li  and Wu, 2011). 
This paper thus seeks to fill this gap by investigating how the existence of institutions that protect 
women from domestic violence influence women’s bargaining positions and subsequently how this 
translates into child development outcomes. The implications of this model, I believe can be replicated in 
other societies with little regard to the cultural or economic setting of the society. 
c. Domestic Violence Laws 
Like many developing societies with strong patriarchal family structures, marriage in Ghana is 
associated high social esteem.  For many societies, though the certificate of marriage confers certain 
rights and powers on the partners involved, the degree of control over decision making within the 
marriage is unequally shared between partners. 
This is because the customary institution, which represents the primary source of legitimacy for 
most marriages in Ghana, does not view women and men as equal partners in marriage. Generally, the 
woman is expected to be subservient and obedient to the husband, and the husband is expected to exercise 
maximum control to keep the house in order. Dery  and Diedong (2014), observes that a prime example of 
this is the traditional right of men to discipline their wives through beating. However, this beating should 
be reasonable, such that it does not cause awful physical injuries or death.  Given this cultural foundation, 
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it is not surprising that domestic violence was seen as a normal practice and a means of maintaining order 
in the household.  
To control domestic violence, the government of Ghana in February 2007 passed the Domestic 
Violence (DV) Act 732 which mandates the Domestic Violence and Victims Support Unit (hence 
DOVVSU) to fight domestic violence in all its forms and to set up a victim support fund to advance that 
cause (GDHS, 2008). The passage of the DV Act has since criminalized most acts of violence against 
women and children, and has fundamentally changed the perception of Ghanaian women on domestic 
violence, including, making it criminal for husband to use force their wives into having sex without 
consent. This has provided a fundamental pathway to empower women by granting women in the 
household, the right to make choices and decisions that best represent their individual interests without 
fear of abuse from their partners.  
Evidence from the literature confirms this assertion. For example, Dery and Diedong (2014) 
using survey data from the Upper West Region of Ghana found that proximity of a household to the 
police or the DOVVSU is negatively related to the occurrence of violence within that household and that 
physical violence has been on a decrease since the passage of the law. 
On the back of this information, the paper explores domestic violence laws as an exogenous 
instrument, which confers bargaining power on women independent of child outcomes. This helps deal 
sufficiently with any potential endogeneity of the main regressor. 
4. Research Design 
Data and Sampling Techniques 
The study is based on micro level data on Ghana from the 2008 Ghana Demographic and Health Survey 
administered by the United States Agency for International Development (USAID). The survey, which is 
based on a nationally representative household sample, provides data for 11,778 households. The survey 
employed two-stage sample design. The first stage involved selecting 412 sample points from an updated 
master sampling frame constructed for the 2000 Ghana Population and Housing Census, using systematic 
sampling with probability proportional to size. The second stage involved systematic sampling of 30 of 
the households listed in each cluster. 
On the data collection, three separate questionnaires were used to collect information from the 
selected sample, namely, the household questionnaire, the women’s questionnaire and the men’s 
Questionnaire. This paper uses data from the women’s survey, which contains information on all women 
age 15-49 in half of the sample households. These women were asked questions about themselves and 
their children born between 2003 and 2008, on topics including but not limited to education, media 
exposure, wealth, vaccinations and childhood illnesses, marriage, occupation and husband’s background 
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characteristics, childhood mortality and domestic violence.  For the purpose of this research, I give a brief 
overview of the key variables of interest as presented in the DHS survey in the following section: 
a. Attitude towards Wife Beating and Domestic Violence 
To capture the empowerment effect of gender equity, the survey collects data on women’s attitude 
towards wife-beating and other forms of violence as a proxy for women’s status in the household. 
Respondents were asked whether a husband is justified in beating his wife under a series of 
circumstances: when wife burns the food, when wife argues with him, when wife goes out without telling 
him, when wife neglects the children, and when wife refuses to have sex with him. Per the structure of the 
survey, responses that suggest a justification of wife beating by husbands is seen as a reflection of the 
woman’s low status. Such views show the acceptance of cultural norms that give men the right to use 
force against women.  (GDHS, 2008). 
b. Household Decision Making Module 
In addition, the survey collected data on direct measures of women’s participation in household decision-
making. Respondents were asked about who makes the final decisions regarding the following issues: 
their own health care and purchases of daily household consumption goods etc. Having a final say in the 
decision-making process is the highest degree of autonomy. Women are considered to participate in a 
decision-making if they make the decision alone or jointly with the husband. Such information provides 
insight into women’s control over their environment and their attitudes towards gender roles, both of 
which are relevant to understanding women’s ability to make independent decisions about their own 
health care and that of their children (GDHS, 2008). 
c. BMI Measurements of Children 
The nutritional status of young children provides a useful gauge for assessing their future health and 
development prospects. However, many under-five children in developing countries are often exposed to 
the risks of childhood illnesses and nutritional deficiencies, which significantly affect their long-term 
health development (GDHS, 2008).  This paper uses the Body Mass Index (BMI) of children as a measure 
of their health status. The BMI, which is measured as weight adjusted for height, is calculated as weight 
in kilograms divided by the square of height in meters. The BMI is important because it reflects both 
current and past nutritional investment in children (GDHS, 2008). Again, the World Health Organization 
(2006) notes that differences in children's weight and height growth up to their fifth birthday are more 
influenced by nutrition and healthcare than genetics or ethnicity. Even though genetic factors matter for 
child height, Martorell and Habicht (1986) explain that they only become more critical in adolescent 
years. 
 The data used captures the BMI as a Z-score. The BMI Z-score can be understood as the number 
of standard deviations of child’s BMI, from the average BMI of her reference group. The World Health 
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Organization uses the Multi-Centre Growth Reference, which comprises more than 8,000 children from 
Brazil, Ghana, India, Norway, Oman and the USA, selected because they grew up in an environment that 
is deemed optimal for a child’s growth (WHO, 2006). In this data, the Z-score is mathematically given as, 
Z-score=
  Xij     −     µij
σij
, 
Where Xij represents the observed height-adjusted weight (BMI) of child of age i and gender j whilst the 
Uij and σij represents the mean and the standard deviations of the reference group with age i and of gender 
group j.  Based on the classifications of the World Health Organization (2006), a child whose BMI is 
below -2 standard deviations of the reference group’s average BMI is considered too thin or underweight 
for her age and gender while a child is said to be overweight if her BMI exceeds +2 standard deviations of 
the reference group’s average BMI. In this paper, we argue that children whose mothers have a major say 
in in deciding daily household consumption goods, have higher BMI than their reference groups. 
5. Estimation Technique and Methodology 
This paper uses the 2-Stage-Least-Square Instrumental Variable (2SLS-IV) estimation approach.  
Per this technique, I build three different models at different stages of the estimation process. The first 
model, which is the most parsimonious model, uses to estimate the relationship between Child’s BMI Z-
score captured as HealthStatusij of child i in household j, and the mother’s degree of say, in making 
decisions on the daily needs for the home, which is captured as MumPowerij.  This is represented 
mathematically as: 
HealthStatusij =α0 + α1MumPower ij + α2FamilyWealth ij + α3MumEduc ij+ εij. 
Based on the data, I create a dichotomous variable for the main regressor. That is, in measuring 
women’s bargaining power, a woman who has a major say in deciding daily household consumption 
goods, is given a value of 1 whilst women who have no say at all in making purchases for meeting 
household daily needs is given a value of 0. Whilst women who make decisions alone possess absolute 
power in making daily household consumption goods decision, the data does not state specifically what 
degree or proportion of power is exercised by women when they make decisions jointly with the husband. 
For the purpose of this paper, we assume that in making joint decisions, women best represent their 
interests and that of their children. 
I expect mumpower > 0 so that women’s bargaining power is positively related to a child’s BMI 
Z-score. FamilyWealth represents the wealth index of the family. It is a dummy variable for a poor 
household whilst MumEduc captures whether the woman has ever received formal education greater than 
or equal to primary school and the stochastic term εij, represents the collective impact of unobserved 
factors on the child’s BMI Z-score. 
The second model, which represents the first stage of the 2SLS-IV estimation, uses the logistic 
regression to estimate the probability that a woman will have bargaining power, given her attitude to wife 
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beating for refusing sex. Here, a woman who thinks wife beating is justified assumes a value of 0 whilst a 
woman who think it is not justified assumes a value of 1. Approximately 17% of the population reported 
that it is justifiable for a man to beat his wife for refusing sex. 
Logit (MumPowerij) =ﻻ0 + ﻻ1Dviolenceij ++ ﻻ2MumEduc ij+ ﻻ3MumEmplo ij+ εij. 
Where Dviolence  is the domestic violence dummy, MumEduc is an educated mother dummy 
and MumEmploy is the dummy for  working mother. 
Guided by the literature I expect Dviolence >0, that is women who reject domestic violence 
should be associated with bargaining power. MumEduc and MumEmplo control for the impact of the 
woman’s education and participation in economic activity in determining her bargaining power whilst the 
error term, εij , captures the effects of unobserved factors on women’s bargaining power. If the hypothesis 
holds, in the second stage of estimation, I replace MumPower with the predicted value of MumPower in 
the second stage of the regression model. This yields the following model: 
HealthStatusij =a0 + a1PredictedMumPowerij, +𝜎′𝑿𝑖+ εij. 
My a priori expectation is that α1>0, and is different from the α1 in the model which means that women 
with bargaining power have children who are likely to have more weight than their reference group. This 
model also includes a set of controls, as robustness check, primarily, mothers educational and health 
characteristics, participation in economic activity, access to mass media, household income, demographic 
and father characteristics, which may affect child health through unobserved channels.  The controls are 
briefly outlined in the ensuing section. 
Mother’s Education 
The literature is well replete with evidence on the positive associations between child development and 
maternal education. Education offers an important channel for empowering women with the knowledge, 
skills and self-confidence necessary to participate fully in the development process (UNFPA, 2013). 
Educated women are able to make informed decisions on their health and that of their household 
members. Given the pivotal role maternal education or the lack thereof, plays in child health 
development, this paper includes a measure that captures whether the mother in question has ever 
received any form of education. This dummy is constructed from the data by assigning zero to women 
who had no education and 1 to those who have obtained either primary, secondary or tertiary education. 
The model does not include measures that captures the individual effects of the different levels or stages 
of education on child health outcomes. Again, there is a possibility that the impact of maternal education 
is underestimated because educated mothers tend to have more surviving children and thus the sampling 
of living children may result in an over-representation of children of educated mothers (Desai and Alva 
1998).  However, since educated women tend to be associated with lower fertility rates than uneducated 
mothers, we hope that, at best, the two effects compensate each other.  
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Household Wealth Index 
The model also controls for the general effect of the household income level on the probability that the 
child is anemic. This is done by including the wealth index variable, which is a composite measure of a 
household's cumulative living standard, calculated by using easy-to-collect data on a household’s 
ownership of selected assets, access to water and sanitation facilities. This index is important because it 
allows me to tease out the relative impact of household income on child health. In the GDHS data, based 
on the composite score, households are classified under 1 of 5 categories in an ascending scale of income 
namely, poorest, poorer, middle, richer and richest. Based on this, I create a dummy to capture poverty, 
which assumes a value of 1 if household is poorer or poorest and 0 if household is not 
Father’s Educational Characteristics 
Father’s educational characteristics can influence child’s health through multiple channels. Educated men 
are less likely to subject their wives to domestic violence and hence lead to greater empowerment of 
women, which in turn, translates, into better child outcomes. Again, educated fathers are on average 
healthier and are more likely to produce and raise healthy children. For instance, Thomas (1994) finds a 
positive association between child health and higher father’s educational attainment. By not controlling 
for father’s education, the impact of mother’s empowerment on child outcomes may be over-estimated. It 
is therefore important to tease out the relative impact of father’s education by including a variable that 
captures this measure. In this paper, I control for father’s educational characteristics by including two 
dummies that capture whether the woman’s partner or husband has had any formal education.  
  
6. Empirical Findings 
OLS Estimates 
Table 1 presents the summary of empirical findings from both the initial OLS and the Instrumental 
Variable estimates. The results suggest that all the predictor variables apart from mother’s age, 
participation in economic activity and household wealth are significant in explaining the variation in 
Child BMI. Specifically, the OLS estimation suggests that women who take part in making decisions 
regarding daily household purchases have children whose Body Mass Index are about 0.15 standard 
deviations (SD) greater than the average BMI of their reference group and this is significant at about 5%. 
The OLS estimates also show that a unit increase in a mother’s own Body Mass Index (proxy for maternal 
health) is associated with an average of 0.04 standard deviation increase in her child’s BMI whilst 
increases in mother’s years of education and child age also increase child BMI by about 0.19 and 0.09 
standard deviations respectively.  
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First Stage Logistic Estimation 
The first stage IV estimation results are summarized in Table 2.  The results of the first stage estimation 
are consistent with our a priori expectations; women who do not believe that domestic violence is justified 
are likely to have the power to make decisions on daily household purchases, either alone or with the 
husband. The co-efficient of the domestic violence variable is 0.85, in the absence of controls and is 
highly significant below 1%. After controlling for woman’s education and her participation in economic 
activity in the past one year, the co-efficient of the domestic violence variable falls to 0.68 but still 
remains highly significant.  Again, our endogeneity concerns are shown to be consistent with the first 
stage estimation, which shows that women with female children tend to have lower bargaining power 
whilst women with healthy children (higher BMI Z-scores) tend to have more bargaining power. 
Second Stage Estimation 
After replacing mother’s bargaining power with the predicted values of mother’s bargaining power 
(which is domestic violence) from the first stage IV estimation, we find that child Body Mass Index 
increases by about 2.5 SDs for women who have bargaining power and remains highly significant. This is 
about 2.35 SDs higher than the co-efficient of the OLS estimation. In this first model of the second stage 
estimation, we still control for mother’s characteristics of health (BMI), years of education, age, and 
participation in economic activity over the past 12 months. We also include child age and household 
poverty to control for the unobserved influences of these factors on child health. The results suggest that 
an increase in a mother’s BMI is associated with about 0.05 standard deviations increase in child BMI. 
An additional year in a child’s life also leads to about 0.09 SD increase in the child’s BMI. These findings 
are all consistent with the literature.  Mother’s participation in economic activity is surprisingly found to 
be negatively related to child health outcome and is statistically significant. Whilst we cannot say much 
about causality, we assume that happens if women’s participation in economic activity, keeps them away 
from children, to the extent that it becomes detrimental to child health. The results also suggest that an 
increase in a woman’s age is negatively related to the health outcome of her child and it is statistically 
significant. Even though this result comes as a surprise, it could also reflect the fact that older women are 
less acquainted with the recent domestic violence laws, and are more in tune with the dictates of the 
norms and traditions, which limit their participation in household decision –making regarding their own 
health and that of their children. Poverty also surprisingly remains insignificant as a determinant of child 
health outcome in both OLS and second stage IV regressions. 
 In the second IV model, we control for the unobserved influences of father’s educational 
characteristics (uneducated father) and age as well the possible impact of rural residency on child health. 
The results, which are also summarized in Table III, suggest that father’s age, educational attainment and 
rural residency have no significant impact on child health. However, the co-efficient of the previous 
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variables change. This may suggest that, in the presence of an old and uneducated father in a rural 
household, mother is bargaining power increases child BMI by 3.08 standard deviation over the reference 
group, which is consistent with the literature. Under these controls, a mother’s age and participation in 
economic activity remain significant and negatively related to her child health whilst child age continues 
to be positive and significant as well but with higher coefficient. 
Hausman Test for Endogeneity 
To test whether the suspected endogenous variable is indeed endogenous and whether our instrumental 
variable is exogenous, we employ the Hausman test for endogeneity.   To do this, we run a reduced form 
of the baseline regression with Mother’s Power as dependent variable. This yields the model. 
 MumPower= π0 + π1X1 ij+ π2X2ij+ π3X3ij+ π4X4ij+ π5X5ij+ π6X6ij+ π7X7ij+ ε 
Where X1 is the domestic violence dummy, X2 is woman’s education in years, X3 is Woman’s BMI, X5 is 
Child Age, X5 is dummy for whether the woman is working, X6 is the woman’s age in years, and X7 is the 
household wealth dummy whilst ε is the error term. Since we suspect that the MumPower variable suffers 
endogeneity from unobserved reverse causation and omitted variable bias, we include the residuals from 
the reduced form equation in the structural form regression below,  
HealthStatus= Z0 + Z1X1 ij+ Z2X2ij+ Z3X3ij+ Z4X4ij+ Z5X5ij+ Z6X6ij+ Z7X7ij + Z8εi +µ, where Z1, Z2... Z7 are the 
explanatory variables in the baseline IV regression, while Z8 is the residuals of the reduced form model.  
The model is run on the null hypothesis that the ε is statistically insignificant and Z8 = 0. If the null 
hypothesis holds, then MumPower is exogenous and does not need IV estimation. However, our Hausman 
test results, summarized in Table 3.0 of the Appendix section, shows that the reduced form residuals are 
statistically significant and thus we reject the null hypothesis that the mother power is exogenous. This 
also confirms that domestic violence dummy is an exogenous instrument for the mother’s bargaining 
power variable. 
Conclusions 
This paper set-off to investigate the impact of the women’s bargaining power on child health outcomes. 
To achieve this, we build a model of intrahousehold bargaining with perceptions of women regarding 
domestic violence and marital rape, and its implications for child health outcomes using the 2-SLS 
Instrumental Variable technique in order to circumvent endogeneity resulting from omitted variable bias 
and unobserved reverse causality between the dependent variable and main regressor.  Our Hausman test 
for endogeneity confirmed this as an exogenous instrument and the IV estimates showed that impact of 
women’s bargaining power on child health is underestimated by the biases in the OLS estimation. We 
also found consistent with the literature that the years of education obtained by a woman and her health 
status directly mattered for the health of her child. Whilst, father’s illiteracy and rural residency and 
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poverty in the household do not matter directly for child health, per our sample, we find that the impact of 
women’s bargaining power on child health tend to increase in households where father has no education.  
 This paper provides strong empirical evidence for women empowerment in order to drive 
investments in child health especially in countries where strong patriarchal family structures that prevent 
the effective participation of women in the household decision-making process. The paper shows that a 
simple, well-carved legislation that protect women from domestic violence and abuse could tremendously 
improve women’s bargaining positions and allow them to independently, make decisions that are in the 
best interest of themselves and their children.  
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Table 1.0 Results of OLS and IV Estimations 
Child BMI OLS Estimates 2SLS- Model 1  
Instrument = Domestic Violence  
2SLS-Model 2 
Mother’s Power 0.148**       [0.076] 2.528***      [1.231] 3.080*     [1.177] 
Mother’s BMI 0.037***     [0.008] 0.046***      [0.011] 0.051***  [0.014] 
Mother’s Education 0.185***     [0.073] 0.143            [0.095] 0.134        [0.116] 
Mother’s Age -0.004          [0.005] -0.022**       [0.012] -0.036**   [0.016] 
Mother Working -0.068          [0.115] -0.643**       [0.331] -0.778*     [0.448] 
Child Age 0.094***     [0.025] 0.091**         [0.032] 0.098***  [0.037] 
Household Wealth (if Poor) -0.060          [0.074] 0.127             [0.397] 0.036        [0.154] 
Non-Educated Father   -0.098       [0.122] 
Father’s Age   0.009        [0.007] 
Residence (if Rural)   0.170        [0.139] 
Observations 1563 1563 1471 
R-Squared 0.04 … … 
F-Stat /Wald Chi2  9.29*** 42.13*** 39.63*** 
*** Significant at 1%       ** Significant at 5%           *Significant at 10% 
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Table 2.0 Results of First Stage Logistic IV Regression 
Woman’s Power Co-efficient P-Value Std. Error 
Domestic Violence (No Controls) 0.085*** 0.000 0.019 
Domestic Violence (With Controls) 0.068** 0.002 0.027 
Woman’s Years of Education 0.032 0.147 0.022 
Woman Working 0.235*** 0.000 0.038 
Woman’s Age 0.007*** 0.000 0.001 
Child Gender (if Female) -0.05** 0.025 0.021 
Child BMI 0.84** 0.087 0.008 
Table 3.0 Hausman Test for Endogeneity 
Reduced Form Model (Dependent =Mother’s Power) Structural Equation (Dependent= Child Health) 
Variables  Co-Efficient  [P-Value] Variables Co-Efficient  [P-Value] 
Domestic Violence1 .361 [0.004]** Mother’s Power 1.553[0.009]** 
Woman’s Years of Education 0.543[0.642] Woman’s Years of Education 0.171[0.019]** 
Woman’s BMI -0.013[258] Woman’s BMI 0.039[0.000]*** 
Child Age 0.021[0.147] Child Age 0.086[0.001]*** 
Woman Working 1.241[0.000]*** Woman Working -0.438[0.023]** 
Woman’s Age 0.037[0.000]*** Woman’s Age -0.012[0.046]** 
Household Wealth -.309[0.009]** Household Wealth 0.027[0.740] 
***Significant at 1%, **Significant at 5%  and * at 10%  Reduced Form Residuals2 -0.584[0.017]** 
1 Domestic Violence is statistically significant 2Residuals are statistically significant 
HO = Residual= 0  i.e. Mother Power is exogenous Since The Residuals in the Structural Equation is 
statistically significant at 5% we  H1 = Residual ≠ 0, i.e. Mother Power is endogenous 
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Table 4 .0 Summary Statistics  
Variable Sample Size Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Child BMI Z-score 1759 -0.54 1.27 -3.94 5.89 
Child Gender Dummy (2 if female, 1 if male) 3299 1.48 0.50 1 2 
Child Age in Years 3128 4.39 5.08 0 5 
Woman’s Age 4916 28.99 9.70 15 49 
Mother Power Dummy  2948 0.78 0.41 0 1 
Woman’s BMI 4814   23.42 4.69 12.18 57.61 
Woman’s Educated Dummy (1 if Yes , 0 if No) 4916 0.75 0.44 0 1 
Woman Working Dummy (=1 if yes, 0 if No) 4916 0.78 0.42 0 1 
Domestic Violence (Dummy) 4916 0.83 0.38 0 1 
Father’s Education Dummy (1 if not educated, 0 if yes) 4916 0.83 0.38 0 1 
Father’s Age in Years 2902 40.23 11.12 18 85 
Household Wealth Status (1 if poor, 0  if not-) 4916 0.409 0.49 0 1 
Residence Dummy (1 if Rural, 0 if Urban) 4916 1.56 0.50 0 1 
